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Protection of the Bank Customer: By Statute or by Ethical
Codes - Which Is Preferable? An Israeli Perspective
Prof Sinai Deutch*
I. THE VARIOUS METHODS OF CONTROLLING BANKS' ACTIVITIES
Banking is a field subjected to close scrutiny. The elaborate and
comprehensive statutory regulation of bank-customer relations ex-
presses the priority that the law gives to the legal, administrative, and
judicial supervision of the banking system. This article will focus upon
the various dimensions of statutory regulation. However, the breadth
of these arrangements notwithstanding, there is considerable discom-
fort regarding the scope and substance of the protection of the bank
customer under the law, particularly with respect to enforcement. In
the author's opinion, the dissatisfaction with the existing arrange-
ments is not surprising, in view of the limits on the supervisory ability
of the authorities, inter alia, by reason of budgetary constraints. With
that in mind, the author proposes to examine the question of whether
it might be preferable to regulate some of the matters by ethical codes
or fair trade conventions (Soft Law) instead of, or in addition to, spe-
cific statutory provisions. This article presents the principle statutory
arrangements which provide for legal enforcement of customer's
rights against banks and the difficulties involved in their implementa-
tion; that presentation will be the background for the author's propo-
sal regarding the adoption of ethical codes.
In the realm of civil law, the bank-customer relationship under Is-
raeli law is governed by no less than five supplementary and parallel
statutory arrangements.1 First, is the laws of obligations: the laws of
* Professor and Dean of the Law School at the Netanya Academic College, Israel. The au-
thor presented the main parts of the article in a lecture that was given at the conference "The
Bank and the Customer - Commercial Developments and Ethical Problems" at the Interna-
tional Ethics and Human Values Centre at 'Mishkenot Sha'ananim' on June 12, 2002. He would
like to thank Dr. Moshe Galbard, Dr. Yisrael Gilat, Prof. Ben-Zion Zilberfarb, Dr. Ruth Flatto-
Shinar, Mrs. Karin Yefet and Mrs. Limor Levy for their useful comments on this article. The
responsibility for the contents is the author's alone.
1. For a comprehensive discussion of these laws, see Sinai Deutch, Bank-Customer Rela-
tions - Contractual and Consumer Aspects, in 163-209 GAD TEDESCHIl MEMORIAL (1995). The
article is updated until 1993; of course since then there have been changes in statutes and case-
law. Recently the comprehensive book of GILAD NARKISS & MORDECHAI MOR, 1 DUTIES AP-
PLICABLE To BANKS (2002), was published.
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contracts, torts2 and unjust enrichment. The central focus of these
laws is general contract law, consisting of the Contracts (General Part)
Law, 5733-1973, 3 and the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Con-
tract) Law, 5731-1970.4 Second, is the special contract laws, such as
the Guarantee Law, 5727-1967, 5 the Security Interests Law, 5727-
19676 and the Agency Law, 5725-1965. 7 Third, is the Standard Con-
tracts Law, 5743-1982.8 Fourth, is the banking laws - the most im-
portant of which are the Banking Ordinance, 1941, 9 and the Banking
(Customer Service) Law, 5741-1981.10 Fifth, is the special laws for the
protection of the bank customer, such as: the Interest Law, 5717-
1957,11 the Charge Cards Law, 5746-1986,12 and the amendments to
the Guarantee Law of 5752-199213 and 5758-1997.14
While the five statutory frameworks are not automatically and si-
multaneously applicable to all transactions, there are in fact many
transactions to which they all apply.
The level of intervention in the contractual relationship between
bank and the customer in the first four legal frameworks differs from
the level of intervention in the fifth. In the first four, the intervention
in the relationship between the parties is not direct. On the other
hand, the laws in the fifth group involve direct interference with the
bank's freedom of action. These laws determine, for example, the
amount of interest in linked loans, the extent of customer liability
where a credit card is lost and the extent of liability incurred by an
"individual guarantor" and a "protected guarantor."
In addition to these provisions, which are primarily of a civil na-
ture, 15 there is another system of direct intervention in the administra-
tive field, by statutory mechanisms for the extensive supervision of
2. In Deutch, supra note 1, the author discussed the contractual and consumer aspects only,
but the duties governing banks in the civil field are based on all the rules of civil law and also
include the law of torts and unjust enrichment. The duty of care under tort law has special
importance; for a discussion of this duty, see NARKISS & MOR, supra note 1, at 275-306.
3. The Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, 8.H. 118.
4. The Contracts Law, 1970, S.H. 16.
5. Id. 1967, S.H. 46.
6. Id. at 48.
7. Id. 1965, S.H. 220.
8. Id. 1982, S.H. 8.
9. Iton Rishmi Supp. 1 (Heb.) 69, (Eng.) 85.
10. The Banking Law, 1981, S.H. 208.
11. Id. 1957, S.H. 50.
12. Id. 1986, S.H. 187.
13. The Guarantee Law (Amendment), 5752 (1992), S.H. 144.
14. The Guarantee Law (Amendment no. 2), 5758 (1997), S.H. 2.
15. There are several penal provisions in the Banking (Customer Service) Law, in §§ 10, 11, &
12, and in the Banking Ordinance, 1941, in §§ 8E, 81(2), 11A1, 14B, 14C, & 15.
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banks, under the Banking (Licensing) Law, 5741-1981,16 the Banking
Ordinance, 1941, and the Bank of Israel Law, 5714-1954.17 These laws
were the basis for the enactment of numerous regulations and rules,
which prescribe detailed arrangements in a number of areas con-
nected to bank management. The supervision exercised under these
statutes is primarily administrative, with criminal sanctions. In this
way these provisions differ from the civil and consumer statutes in the
area of banking.
Foremost among the entities supervising the banks are the Exam-
iner of the Banks and the Governor of the Bank of Israel, whose pow-
ers are elaborated in detail in dozens of laws, regulations, and orders.
There are however additional authorities that regulate certain aspects
of the supervised banks' activities. For example, the Securities Au-
thority supervises matters connected to securities consultation, and
the Director of the Capital Market supervises matters relating to
provident funds. Moreover, under section 8A(a) of the Banking Ordi-
nance, the Bank Examiner may demand that a bank correct defects in
the proper management of its business. Over the years, the Bank Ex-
aminer has given public expression to his concern for the norms re-
quired for proper bank management, in the form of instructions
published within the framework of the Examiner's circulars. Since
August 1991 the instructions have been published in the collection of
Directives for Proper Bank Management.18 These directives provi-
sions do not have the normative status of statutes or regulations, but
the banks regard them as binding.
What is the source for the normative validity of the norms of proper
bank management? When the Examiner orders the bank to correct
defects in the management of its business under section 8A of the
Banking Ordinance and a bank does not obey, he can adopt serious
measures under section 8C of the Ordinance. 19 Failure to comply with
these measures may lead to criminal sanctions under section 8E of the
Ordinance. Nevertheless, provisions regarding proper management
are general norms, and their breach as such does not constitute a
16. The Banking Law, 1981, S.H. 232.
17. Id. 1954, S.H. 192.
18. BANK OF ISRAEL, PROVISIONS FOR PROPER BANK MANAGEMENT (1991).
19. Section 8A of the Banking Ordinance 1941 provides that the Bank Examiner should send
a notice to a banking corporation regarding defects that may impair its ability to meet its obliga-
tions or the proper conduct of its business, and he may demand their rectification or the adop-
tion of preventative measures. Section 8C provides that should the Examiner deem that the
banking corporation has not rectified the defects within the prescribed period, he may order the
corporation to adopt different measures and even suspend and restrict the powers of the board
of directors, a business manager, or an authorized signatory.
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breach of section 8A. A special notice of the Examiner to the bank is
required in order to adopt the procedures prescribed in section 8A.
As stated, the banks regard themselves as bound by these provisions.
But, breach of the provisions as such does not constitute grounds for
the right of a civil action by a customer who has been harmed.
The five frameworks of civil law, together with supervisory laws and
extensive supervisory mechanisms create a situation in which the field
of banking is one of the fields in which there is the tightest and closest
legal supervision, similar to the supervision of the field of insurance.
Governmental intervention and supervision of business activity may
occur at four levels, constituting a normative-supervisory hierarchy.
The first level is judicial review on the basis of civil and consumer
legislation. The second level is review of standard bank contracts
under the Standard Contracts Law. The third level is administrative
supervision by bodies empowered to supervise the business activity of
the banking corporation. The fourth and highest level is the direct
legislative intervention in the contents of the agreement. As the de-
gree of intervention in the banking activities increases, so too does the
conflict between the regulatory laws and the principles of the freedom
of contract and freedom of occupation. Under Israeli law, these two
freedoms now have constitutional status under the Basic Law: Free-
dom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. 20
Traditionally, there has been considerable opposition to such exten-
sive intervention of the law, and particularly with regard to direct leg-
islative intervention. 21  The argument is that judicial and
administrative review is preferable to direct legislative intervention,
whereas it is ideal for the banks' themselves to exercise self-restraint.
On the other hand the centrality of the banking sphere to the con-
sumer public, necessitated legislative intervention in bank-customer
relations at various levels, including the most direct methods of inter-
vention. This is not surprising in view of the important economic in-
terests served by the banking system and in view of the essential need
to protect customers who have deposited their money and savings in
the bank. The essential need for supervision is emphasized by the
scandals that have plagued the public in the past, such as the collapse
of the Eretz-Israel Britannia Bank and the North America Bank and
20. 1994, S.H. 90 and 1992 S.H. 150. For a general discussion of the constitutional aspects of
consumer legislation, see Sinai Deutch, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS: FUNDAMENTALS AND
PRINCIPLES (2001), 527-618. Please see part 4, entitled The Constitutionality of Consumer Pro-
tection Laws - Consumer Protection Laws in the Light of the New Basic Laws.
21. See, e.g., Yechiel Bahat, The Guarantee Law - On the Amendment to the Amendment,
BANKING Q. 32, 77 (1993). See also Aaron Berglas, Economic Aspects of Legislation and Case-
law Relating to Bank-Customer Relations, BANKING Q. 30,102 (1992).
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recently the scandal of the Commercial Bank, where customer monies
were stolen and embezzlement was committed with regard to more
than 200 million NIS (about fifty million dollars).
The question that this article seeks to address is, whether in view of
the difficulties in operating the supervision systems in the field of
banking, it would not be preferable to consider replacing some of
these with codes of ethics or to consider adding such codes as a
backup for the existing supervision. The possibility of using codes of
ethics and codes of practice (soft law) instead of supervision, or in
addition thereto, has not been considered in Israel in the context of
bank-customer relations. But before this question is considered, the
level of enforcement of the supervision under the law as a means of
consumer protection must be first addressed.
II. BANK CONSUMER PROTECTION IN LEGISLATION AND CASE-
LAW - ENFORCEMENT DIFFICULTIES
As noted above, the civil legislation regarding bank-customer rela-
tions comprises no less than five sets of laws. These laws are briefly
considered below.
A. General Contract Laws
General contract laws 22 provide real protection for bank customers.
In numerous judgments regarding contract laws, courts ruled in favor
of customers in their disputes with the bank. 23 In addition to the
banks' duties pursuant to contracts between the bank and the cus-
tomer and duties pursuant to the provisions of the contract laws, case-
law introduced the fiduciary duty owed by the bank to its customers.
The duty was the basis of a significant number of court decisions con-
cerning bank-customer relations. This duty can be classified as a con-
tractual duty in the broad sense of the term. Its basis may be derived
from sections 25 and 26 of the Contracts (General Part) Law as part of
the interpretation of the contract and supplementary details, or as a
part of good faith and the contractual duties of disclosure enshrined in
sections 12 and 39 of the General Contracts Law,24 even though the
behavioural standard mandated by the fiduciary duty is higher than
that of the regular duty of good faith.
22. The same is true with regard to the laws of tort and unjust enrichment. Not wishing to
expand too much on this topic, which could fill up volumes, the author has limited the presenta-
tion of this point in the present context mainly to the laws of contract.
23. For a list of nine sample judgments in the article see Deutch, supra note 1, at 183; note 107.
24. For an interesting survey of the development of these rules, see CA 5893/91 Tefahot Israel
Mortgage Bank Ltd v. Tzabah, P.D. 48(2) 573, 590-595.
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This rule was first established twenty-five years ago in the case of
Israel Mortgage Bank v. Hirschco.2 5 It was reaffirmed and elaborated
upon in the leading case in this field, CA 5993/91 Tefahot Israel Mort-
gage Bank Ltd v. Tzabah,26 in which mortgage agreements with cus-
tomers were declared void due to the bank's negligence and its non-
compliance with the directives of the Bank of Israel. The court held
that the bank breached the duties of disclosure by which it was bound,
in accordance with the laws and the laws of contract.
In all matters connected to customers' money in its possession,
the bank and its officers shall act in the best interests of the custom-
ers. Bank-customer relationships are relationships premised upon
the customer's dependence on the bank. Moreover, the "double
loyalty" that may arise in balancing the customer's best interests on
the one hand and bank profitability on the other hand, necessitates
a large degree of integrity, honesty and fairness. Because of the
accumulation of data in the possession of the bank's officials, and
because of the dependence of the customer on the advice of the
bank officials and on the services that they provide, corruption may
easily occur. There is a fiduciary relationship between banks and
their customers, and in the planning of their financial affairs, cus-
tomers are guided in planning by the banks' employees, who must
conduct themselves with a high level of integrity and avoid being
subject to irrelevant influences in the discharge of their roles in re-
spect of each individual customer and to the public generally.27
The judgment further cites the following passage from an article of
Prof. Ariel Porat:
Customers and non-customers tend to repose special trust in the
banker with whom they come into contact, and in the abilities of the
bank and its technical resources. In many cases they do not seek
another opinion before they act on its recommendation, and nor do
they carefully scrutinize its actions. Admittedly, this confidence has
been undermined over the years, as a result of several events that
had widespread public repercussions, particularly the bank shares
crisis in 1983. Yet it would appear that generally speaking, the loss
of confidence relates to the banking system as a whole, and not nec-
essarily to the particular bank employee with whom the individual
comes into daily contact. The public at large still regards the latter
as a reliable person, an expert in his work, and whose main function
is to provide it with fair and professional services. The public func-
tions fulfilled by the bank further fortify this impression. The
banks, for their part, diligently attempt to increase public confi-
dence in them, and it is only reasonable that duties be imposed on
25. Israel Mortgage Bank v. Hirschco, CA 1/75, P.D. 29(1) 208 (Justice Witkon).
26. See CA 5893/91 Tefahot Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd v. Tzabah, P.D. 48(2) 573, 591.
27. This passage cited from the Tefahot v. Tzabah judgment is taken from CrimA 122/84
Manzour v. State of Israel, P.D. 38(4) 94, 101 (per President Shamgar).
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them which reflect the reasonable expectations that they themselves
play a part in forming. 28
This rule has been widely affirmed in many judgments. And, in fact
there are numerous court decisions in which courts ruled in favor of
the customers on the basis of this rule. However, the relevant ques-
tion is whether the general law of contracts provides appropriate tools
for regulation of bank-customer relations?
The answer is no, and for two reasons: the first as a matter of princi-
ple and the second as a matter of practicality. On the level of princi-
ple, general contract laws impose general duties, such as a prohibition
of misrepresentation and exploitation, the duty of good faith, the fidu-
ciary duty, and the duty of care.29 These duties vary from case to case,
as the Supreme Court of Israel held in Tefahot v. Tzabah:
"Nonetheless, one should not conclude from this [the duty of trust]
that the duty of the bank to the customer is identical in every case.
The extent of the duty and the "level of trust" required of the bank
beyond the general basic level vary from case to case and are af-
fected by the nature of the relationship between the bank and the
customer, the extent of the bank's involvement in this relationship
and other variables. '30
In other words - and this is the inherent problem - without litiga-
tion in the courts and prior to judgment being given, we cannot know
whether in the circumstances of the case the bank breached its fiduci-
ary duty to the customer, or not. Indeed, in the dozens of judgments
given on this issue, we find that in different cases the courts reached
different outcomes.
The second reason is a practical one. Court decisions are made on a
local and individual basis. Judicial intervention on an individual basis
is the lowest level of intervention, and it does not violate contractual
freedom or the Basic Laws. This is also the reason for the court's
tendency to use the general laws of contract for intervention in the
bank-customer relationship more than other laws. Since decisions are
28. See Ariel Porat, Law of Torts, ISRAEL LAW ANNUAL, (1992-1993) 301, 324. This passage
has been cited in several judgments that adopted its perspective of the duty of trust of banks to
their customers.
29. The duty of care is, in general, a term from the field of the law of torts. However it is
customary to regard the duty of care in the field of bank-customer relations also as a duty in the
contractual sphere. Prof. Ben-Uliel in his book also deals with the contractual duty of care
derived from sections 12 and 39 of the Contracts (General Part) Law. See Ricardo Ben-Uliel,
Banking Law, General Part, the Harry and Michael Sacker Institute for Research of Legislation
and Comparative Law, 1996, 86-91. See also NARKISS & MOR, supra note 1, at 278-279. As the
author previously noted in note 2 supra that any reference within this framework to contractual
duties also includes other obligations such as the law of torts.
30. See CA 5893/91 Tefahot Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd v. Tzabah, P.D. 48(2) 573, 592.
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given on a concrete basis for each particular case, each dispute must
come to court. The result is that there is a need for litigation in every
case; in the author's opinion, this is an unsatisfactory method for the
enforcement of customers' rights.
Moreover, reliance on the general laws of contract alone is not a
practical solution for the customer, because of the time required for
enforcing his rights in the courts. An action usually begins in the
Magistrates' Court. An appeal will be filed to the District Court and
an application for leave to appeal will be filed in the Supreme Court.
The proceedings are protracted, and their outcome is unclear. For ex-
ample, take the case of Tefahot Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd v. Lippert.31
It began in 1983 and the Supreme Court gave its final judgment in
1993. It is an untenable situation that legal battles of this nature be
conducted on an individual basis and continued in court for years on
end.32
The case of Tefahot v. Lippert raises difficult questions about the
ethical behaviour of banks in certain cases. In that case, Mr Lippert
guaranteed a loan to buy an apartment that was supposed to be se-
cured by a mortgage. Because of the bank's negligence, the bank gave
the mortgage without ensuring that the apartment was purchased and
the mortgage registered in favour of the bank. Mr Lippert was a new
immigrant from France whose fluency in Hebrew was limited. It was
questionable whether he had even understood what he had signed.
His income was minimal, and ethically speaking the logic of action
against him was highly questionable, given that it was the bank that
had been negligent and the new immigrant was unable to pay. None-
theless, the bank sued Mr.Lippert, the guarantor, and the ensuing le-
gal proceedings stretched out over ten years, going from the
Magistrates' Court through to the Supreme Court. In the Supreme
Court the bank finally won the case with its argument that the duties
of bank disclosure only apply to relations between banks and custom-
ers and not to the relations between banks and guarantors. In fact,
even after the Supreme Court ruled in the bank's favour, no attempt
was made to collect the money. The Supreme Court's judgment led to
the amendment of Banking (Customer Service) Law in 1994. An ex-
31. Tefahot Israel Mortgage Bank Ltd v. Lippert, CA 1304/91, P.D. 47(3) 309.
32. Apparently, even when there is direct legislation on banking matters, failing effective im-
plementation and compliance, the customer has no alternative but to litigate in the court. How-
ever, experience teaches that we should distinguish between applying general norms from the
fields of contract law, tort law and bank consumer protection law with regard to which there
might be a real dispute. This distinguishment will compel the parties to litigate in the court, and
direct, clear, specific and binding statutory provisions. Experience shows that the banks respect
such provisions, and litigation reaches the courts on relatively few occasions.
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plicit provision was introduced in section 17A of the law, prescribing
that the provisions of the law would apply also to someone who was a
guarantor for a customer in favour of a banking corporation. The
bank could have been expected to act more responsibly than to drag
an impecunious guarantor through litigation in three courts, when the
bank itself was the negligent party. In any event, the bank did not
succeed in collecting the money and the law was changed to the
bank's detriment. Tefahot v. Lippert is an example of the cases where
the banks fail to show sensitivity to the public, something which does
not contribute to the reputation of the banking system. Had the deci-
sion-makers in the banks devoted more attention to ethics and human
values, that case would not have reached litigation in the court.
An additional difficulty in relying on the general laws of contract
lies in the fact that its solutions are premised upon a defect in the
actual establishment of the contractual engagement between the bank
and customer for purposes of the transaction, and do not usually con-
tain protection against abuse of the terms of the contract. The
problems in bank-customer relations classically derive from the funda-
mental and inherent inequality between the bank and the customer as
contractual partners. These are problems of market failure or market
structure, and in any event, solutions provided for individuals cannot
provide a general solution for this problem.
B. Special Contract Laws
Special contract laws such as the Pledge Law, the Agency Law, the
Guarantee Law in its original version and the Bailees Law, 5727-
1967, 33 provide little protection to the bank customer. These statutes
are based on contractual freedom, individual autonomy, and equal,
balanced bargaining positions of the parties. The provisions of these
statutes are too general, and the few provisions that may be used to
protect the bank customer are not binding; it is possible to contract
out of them and in fact this has, and continues to be standard bank
practice. An example is the Guarantee Law, which was enacted in
1967. Until the statute was amended in 1990s, it did not help guaran-
tors at all, and almost every provision in it for the protection of the
guarantor was cancelled in the bank guarantee documents, since con-
ditions can be made upon the provisions of the statute.
33. 1967, S.H. 52. These laws do not relate necessarily to banks' duties to their customers.
Obviously the Pledge Law, the Agency Law, and the Bailees Law do not refer specifically to
bank-customer relations. Even the Guarantee Law is not specifically intended for this relation-
ship, even though the issue of the guarantee, unlike the other subjects, is a very central issue in
bank-customer relations.
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C. Standard Contracts
Bank contracts are standard contracts. In the Israeli legal system,
standard contracts are subject to two levels of control: judicial review
control exercised in regular courts and administrative control exer-
cised by the Standard Contracts Tribunal (S.C.T.). It was expected
that given their cardinal importance for the market, bank contracts
too would be subjected to close supervision, both within the courts
and within the framework of the S.C.T.34 Unfortunately, this was
never the case. Supervision under the Standard Contracts Law has
been a complete failure. Courts do not, as a rule, intervene on the
basis of the Standard Contracts Law in the content of the contracts
between a bank and its customers and the occasions when they do
intervene are few and far between.35 In this matter the courts con-
tinue, as a rule, the conservative tradition of not cancelling oppressive
provisions in standard contracts.
In recent years however, the Supreme Court has actually had more
frequent resort to the Standard Contracts Law, 36 but this trend has yet
to make its mark in the field of bank-customer relations. The Stan-
dard Contracts Tribunal has also failed in its attempts to regulate the
contents of the bank contract, in accordance with the provisions of the
Standard Contracts Law. No standard contract between a bank and a
customer has ever been thoroughly examined in the Standard Con-
tracts Tribunal. Nor has the tribunal ever approved or invalidated any
other bank contract. 37 In the standard book38 on the subject, mention
was made of standard contracts in many business fields, but not in the
field of banking, except for the credit card contract, in respect of
which section 20 of the Charge Cards Law, 5746-1986, stipulates a
duty to obtain approval in the Standard Contracts Tribunal.
34. See Sinai Deutch, Controlling Standard Contracts: The Israeli Version, 30 McGILL L.J. 458
(1985); Sinai Deutch, Control of Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Law and Practice, 13 J. OF
CONSUMER POL 189 -199 (1991).
35. See Deutch, supra note 1, at 174-183. Since the article was written, dozens of additional
judgments have been given, but as of December 2003 the results have remained the same.
36. See CA 294/91 Burial Society v. Kestenbaum, 46 (2) P.D. 464 (per Justice Barak). See also
LCA 1185/97 Milgrom's Estate v. Mishan Centre, 53 (4) P.D. 145.
37. For years litigation was conducted regarding the basic current account contract of one of
the large banks. The application was struck out after they failed to reach agreement. In 1985, the
Ministry of Justice undertook to deal with the bank contracts. See Deutch, supra note 1, at 182.
Seventeen years have passed, and nothing has happened.
38. Tana Schpanitz & Varda Lusthauss, STANDARD CONTRACTS (1994).
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D. Banking Laws
The banking laws, and in particular the Banking Ordinance, 1941,
and the Banking (Customer Service) Law, 5741-1981, only provide
protection to bank customers in a relatively narrow range of issues.
The Banking Ordinance deals mainly with the regulation of banking
business and only a small part of its provisions apply to bank-customer
relations. The Banking (Customer Service) Law in its entirety deals
with bank-customer relations, but most of its provisions deal with the
engagement stage of the contract, and not with the contents of its con-
ditions or their performance. The law deals mainly with the following
issues: a duty to provide certain services (which, incidentally, are very
limited) that do not include giving credit, a prohibition of misleading,
a duty of fair disclosure and giving information and a prohibition
against making one service conditional on another. Thus, despite the
law's broad title, the scope of its substantive provisions is limited, and
except for the issue of making one service conditional on another,
there are almost no major court decisions with regard to the law.
Moreover, the provisions of the law are general3 9 and difficult to im-
plement. Its civil remedies are limited exclusively to compensation.
Even the addition of the remedy of a class action under the Banking
(Customer Service) Law has not made a significant change, because of
the limited application of the law and the conservative, reserved ap-
proach of the Israeli courts to class actions.40 There are however,
prospects for a change in the courts' attitude to banking class actions,
which will ultimately lead to more class actions in this field being
approved.41
Conceivably, in practice the Banking (Customer Service) Law has
had a larger influence than is reflected in case-law. Section 16 of the
law provides for the Bank Examiner to investigate public complaints,
and a consumer complaints unit has in fact been established in the
39. See, e.g. C.App (TA) 136834/00 Meir v. Discount Bank, Takdin (Mag.) 2001 (3) 348 (stat-
ing "While the provisions of the Banking Law are general and broad, the relevant provisions of
the Guarantee Law are detailed and specific."). This judgment was given by the Magistrates'
Court, but it correctly articulates one of the problems of the Banking (Customer Service) Law,
5741-1981.
40. For a discussion of the reserved approach of the courts to representative actions, see Sinai
Deutch, Consumer Class Actions: The Requirement of Personal Reliance on the False Representa-
tion of the Misleader, MA'AZANEI MISHPAT 2, 97-153 (2002); Sinai Deutch, Consumer Class
Actions - Difficulties and a Proposed Solution, BAR ILAN LAW STUD. 20, 299-377 (2004).
41. An example of this trend is the ruling in C.C. 2033/00 Sagiv v. Bank Leumi Leyisrael Ltd.
16.12.03 (not yet published). In this judgment an important class action was approved against
the two largest banks in Israel, on the grounds of misrepresentations to customers.
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Supervision of Banks Department. 42 As a result of the enactment of
the law, persons responsible for public complaints have been ap-
pointed in all banks and in the Bank of Israel too.43 In addition, many
issues are controlled by regulations made under the law,44 e.g. the
Proper Bank Management Rules, published under the instructions of
the Bank Examiner. 45 These provisions are not anchored in the Bank-
ing (Customer Service) Law, but rather, in the Banking Ordinance.
Summing up, the banking laws are not as useful as could be expected,
but nevertheless, they do influence bank-customer relations.
E. Laws that Specifically Protect the Bank Customer
On the other hand, the laws that specifically protect the bank cus-
tomer, such as the Interest Law, the Charge Cards Law, and the
amendments to the Guarantee Law over the last decade have had the
most success in effectively protecting customer rights in the fields to
which they relate. There are almost no court decisions regarding the
statutory provisions protecting consumers in these laws. The reason is
clear: the provisions of these statutes are specific and precise. Their
implementation does not generally require judicial intervention or
protracted court proceedings, because banks, as a rule, uphold the
provisions of the law when they are clear and detailed.
These provisions are binding and the banks may not place condi-
tions upon their applicability unless they are for the customers' bene-
fit. Naturally, banking circles have strongly criticized these laws, but
in retrospect it is clear that they have caused no damage to the bank-
ing system.
The result is that despite the existence of extensive supervisory leg-
islation in the field of banking, which has increased during the last
twenty years, in most areas enforcement is partial at most, and its ef-
fectiveness in many cases is questionable. The overall picture is there-
fore one of relatively minor success in enforcement by law. This raises
the question of whether better substitutes for the existing supervision
might not be found. The main argument is that customer protection is
best ensured by the self-restraint of the banks and not by additional
42. Case law too gives expression to the activities of the public complaints unit. See, for ex-
ample, CC (TA) 58199/93 Goldenberg v. United Mizrahi Bank Ltd, Dinim (Mag.) 17, 623, 8;
CC (TA) 18051/99 Pinkovsky v. Leumi Mortgage Bank Ltd, Dinim (Mag.) 16, 727, T 4.
43. This is evidenced in the response of Mr. Zeev Abeles, the chairman of the board of direc-
tors of Bank Iggud, formerly Bank Examiner, to my lecture at the 'Mishkenot Sha'ananim' Con-
ference, on June 12, 2002.
44. See, e.g. the Banking (Customer Service) (Proper Disclosure and Delivery of Documents)
Regulations, 5752-1992, Kovetz Takkanot 1512.
45. See supra notes 18-19 and the text to which they refer.
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legislation. The main question is: should the supervisory systems be
replaced by ethical codes?
A comparison with the banking laws in the United States may be of
assistance in solving that question. U.S. law in this field, like in other
fields, 46 serves as a source of inspiration and comparison. In U.S. law,
in the area of banking, the laissez-faire approach prevailed, almost
without any Government intervention, until the end of the nineteen-
sixties.47
Yet it emerged that the hegemony of the laissez-faire approach led
to its abuse by the banks in various fields of bank-consumer rela-
tions.48 This gave rise to intensive federal legislation at the end of the
sixties and the beginning of the seventies comprising several impor-
tant statutes with binding provisions intended to protect bank custom-
ers.49 The banks in the United States also argued that customer
protection would result in the collapse of the banks and would lead to
the destruction of the credit market, but their arguments were re-
jected; the protective laws and regulations were approved and nothing
happened to the credit market, which50 continued to prosper rapidly.
It is interesting to point out that in the United States too, opposition
to the legislation did not issue exclusively from the banks, but also
came from the bank supervisory system, led by the Federal Reserve
Bank.51 The legislature in the United States ignored the opposition
and enacted the legislation required to protect bank customers, and as
stated - nothing happened. Notably, even during the twelve years of
rule by right wing presidents, and despite an aggressive campaign dur-
ing the eighties in the United States for deregulation in the field of
banking, the customer protective banking legislation remained intact,
since there was inter-factional agreement that customer protection is a
46. See Deutch, supra note 40, at 135-144, regarding the importance of U.S. Law as a source of
inspiration.
47. See John Spanogle, Regulation of the Bank-Consumer Relationship in the United States, 4 J.
BANKING & FIN. 18, 21 (1993).
48. Id. at 19-21. The issues examined were (1) duties relating to disclosure of the real interest;
(2) discrimination in giving credit; (3) examinations of credit reporting; (4) dismissal from work
as a result of non-payment of debts; (5) harm to consumers resulting from the rules of 'holder in
due course'; (6) liability for loss of credit cards; and (7) mistakes in credit card accounts.
49. The main statutes in these areas were the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 146
(1968); Truth in Lending, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667C (2004); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
U.S.C.A § 1691-1691g (2004); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681g (2004); Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1672-1674 (2004); Holder in Due Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R.
§ 433 (1975); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693-1693R (2004); Fair Credit Billing
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1666-1666j (2004).
50. Spanogle, supra note 46, at 23.
51. Id. at 22.
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worthy interest, irrespective of the particular stance adopted toward
the issue of limitation of government supervision of banking.52
The U.S. experience shows that in the absence of legislative inter-
vention, one cannot rely upon the banks to strike a more reasonable
balance in the legal relationship between them and the customers.
Experience shows that interests can be balanced exclusively by legisla-
tion. The standard arguments that such legislation will destroy bank-
ing and the credit market have been proven unfounded.
III. SUPERVISION OF THE BANKS IN ISRAEL
The banks in Israel are subject to close scrutiny by several bodies,
chief of which is the Bank Examiner. The Securities Authority and
the Supervisor of the Capital Market oversee certain other areas of
bank activity. Prior to the 1980's the image of the banks in Israel was
almost untainted. It was then that the bank share scandal occurred;
and subsequently the Bejski Commission 53 was established and the
bank directors were compelled to resign. Since there have been a
number of scandals,54 the most recent of them being the collapse of
the Commercial Bank following the embezzlement of a quarter of a
billion sheqels, five times the capital of the bank. Apparently, there is
a significant discrepancy between the image of closely scrutinized
banks and the facts on the ground.
The question arises: who is responsible in the event of failure?
There is no doubt that, first and foremost, despite all the public super-
visory mechanisms, the primary responsibility is that of bank manage-
ments. Secondarily, the liability is that of the various supervisory
bodies in the banking system, such as the control board, the banks'
accountants, its boards of directors, and additional bodies. Finally, the
State bears responsibility. The public relies on the State authorities to
properly discharge their role of supervising the bank system. The
52. Id. at 18. It is interesting to note that legislation in the United States did indeed lead to
the desired results. Id. at 24. Spanogle emphasizes in his article that the legislation led to the
redressing of most of the injustices that occurred prior to the legislation. The statutes deter-
mined provisions that were not optional, but binding. Apparently, it was only the Government
regulations based on the legislation which led to an improvement of the situation. Id. at 25.
Spanogle, in his article published in Australia, used the U.S law as basis of comparison for Aus-
tralian law. He concluded given that the inability of the Australian banking system to correct
itself, it is questionable as to whether distortions in the relations between banks and customers in
Australia can be corrected by way of voluntary codes. Id. at 26-28.
53. The criticism of the abuse of the economic power of the banks led to the appointment of
the Commission of Enquiry for the Bank Shares Manipulation (1986). The Bejski Commission
confirmed the allegations leveled against the banks.
54. For example, the collapse of the North American Bank, the collapse of the Eretz-Israel
Britannia Bank, the scandal involving the former director of Bank Leumi, Mr Ernest Yafet, etc.
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public assumes that the authorities closely scrutinize the banks. In-
deed, it is for this reason that many supervisory measures are set out
in the Banking Ordinance, the Bank of Israel Law, and the Banking
(Customer Service) Law. The question is whether these powers are
exercised on a level that provides sufficient protection for the public?
In one of the few cases that reached a judicial decision, it emerged
that the government authorities care less for the "the little man" and
the customer than the courts. This was evidenced in an attempt made
during the nineties to close the banks to the general public on Fridays.
In a judgment on this issue,55 the Antitrust Tribunal accepted the posi-
tion of the consumer organizations rather than that of the banks, the
Bank Examiner, and the General Director of the Antitrust Authority.
Whereas the supervisory bodies and the banks, under the pressure of
the employees' committees, were prepared to close the bank branches
on Fridays, which would have caused the consumer public great harm.
However, the Tribunal ruled against the supervisory bodies and held
that the bank branches should remain open.
As a result of the Commercial Bank crisis in 2002, it was again pro-
posed to undertake a comprehensive reform with regard to the bank
supervision. The proposal is to establish an authority to supervise fi-
nancial services, which will include the bodies that supervise the
banks, the capital market, and the insurance companies. The signifi-
cance of this step lies in the removal of bank supervision from the
responsibility of the Bank of Israel, in view of the fact that in recent
years the Governors of the Bank of Israel were not prepared to be-
come actively involved in dealing with the directors of the banks. The
proposal is not a new one, and was inspired by a similar English initia-
tive, which led to the establishment of an authority for financial ser-
vices, responsible for the supervision of the capital market, the banks,
and the insurance companies. 56 These types of proposals have been
raised in the past, unrelated to the recent crisis, in order to standard-
ize the levels of supervision and review for non-bank financial institu-
tions too, which are currently permitted to do acts that in the past
55. See RP (Jer.) 1393/96 with regard to an application to approve a restrictive arrangement,
General Director of the Antitrust Authority v. Israel Consumer Council, Dinim (Distr.) 32(1)
129 (Jan. 27, 1997).
56. Many articles have been published in the media on this issue. See, e.g., David Lipkin,
Interpretation - A Critical Step, MAARIV Bus., May 27, 2002, at 3. Two other comprehensive
articles were published in that newspaper, one of Yosi Greenstein, Shalom Puts Together a Su-
preme Supervisory Authority, MAARIV Bus., at 2, and a background article, The Bank ofIsrael Is
Concerned, MAARIV Bus., at 3.
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were clearly reserved for banks. Nonetheless, the recent crisis in-
creased the possibility of implementing these proposals. 57
A study of the difficulties in enforcing the rights of the bank con-
sumer in legislation and case-law raises the question as to whether it
would not be proper to replace some of the civil, administrative, and
criminal supervisory systems with codes of ethics based on codes of
practice. As stated, it may be presumed that budgetary constraints
limit the supervisory ability of the authorities.58 On the other hand, it
is possible that norms and restrictions stand greater chances of realiza-
tion where the banking sector voluntarily adopted them and is actively
involved in their drafting, adopting, and enforcing. Ethical codes and
conventions for fair trade (Soft Law) have been accepted in several
countries around the world, but they have not yet been substantially
adopted in Israel. Conceivably, in the field of banking there is a basis
for considering the formulation and adoption of ethical codes, either
to replace some of the supervisory systems or in addition to them.59
IV. ETHICAL CODES AS A SUBSTITUTE OR IN ADDITION TO
LEGISLATIVE ENFORCEMENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE BANKING CONSUMER
60
An examination of the legal literature on the subject of codes of
ethics in the field of consumer protection shows that ethical codes do
not contribute significantly to customer protection and that protection
of the consumer by way of ethical codes is fraught with difficulties.
The concept of ethical codes, which can also be defined as soft
law, 61 derives from international law, where alongside binding con-
ventions there are also consensual documents that do not have the
status of a binding convention. For example, together with binding
57. See Ben Zion Zilberfarb, "Supervision of the Capital Market," Privatization and Reform
of the Capital Market, The Jerusalem Centre for Public and State Affairs and Milkin Institute,
Jerusalem, at 53-58 (Sept. 2000).
58. This is based, inter alia on the introductory remarks of Prof. Itzhak Zamir at the confer-
ence, "The Bank and the Customer - Ethical Problems," at Mishkenot Sha'ananim on June 12,
2002. Justice Zamir served as Attorney-General and as a justice of the Supreme Court.
59. In the first chapters of the article, the need for increasing government supervision was
stressed on several occasions. It would seem however, that the imperative of increased govern-
ment supervision raises questions as to the desirability of adopting ethical codes as a substitute
for supervision. Nonetheless, in view of the difficulties in effectively implementing and exercis-
ing the supervision, there is a basis for examining this path as a substitute or as an addition to the
enforcement under the law.
60. For a preliminary discussion of the possibility of introducing codes of practice in Israel, see
Deutch, supra note 20, 157-159.
61. See Jyrki Tala, Soft Law as a Method for Consumer Protection and Consumer Influence, 10
J. CONS. POLICY, 341 (1987).
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conventions the United Nations documents also include documents
known as guidelines or recommendations. Consumer protection was
also unanimously endorsed by the United Nations in 1985 within the
framework of a document known as the U.N. Guidelines for Con-
sumer Protection. A closer example is the Code for Conduct of Mul-
tinational Enterprise of the OECD.
Why is there a need for ethical codes in the field of consumer pro-
tection? At the end of the sixties and at the beginning of the seventies
major reforms were made in the field of consumer protection all over
the world. Similar reforms were made in Israeli law at the beginning
of the eighties. 62 However, these reforms were only partially success-
ful. As we noted above, commercial organizations are, for the most
part, opposed to such legislation, inter alia, because of its costs. The
movement that supports codes of ethics is a part of the trend of der-
egulation. We have also seen that in the banking field the prevailing
approach is to leave the legislative, judicial, and administrative super-
vision intact. The question is: why is there a basic mistrust of ethical
codes in the field of banking?
The explanation lies in the numerous shortcomings in the very at-
tempt to replace binding legal norms with ethical codes whose entire
validity is premised on the willingness of the relevant commercial bod-
ies to cooperate and exercise self-restraint. These shortcomings exist
despite the fact that the term "ethical" codes does not refer to moral
and ethical behaviour on the part of business people, but to docu-
ments whose structure is similar to binding legislation. In a series of
articles appearing in the seventh volume of the Journal of Consumer
Policy, three criteria were formulated for ethical codes: 1) they are
designed to function similarly to legal norms; 2) they are prepared on
the basis of provisions of statute or in cooperation with supervisory
bodies on behalf of the authorities; 3) the affected bodies in the mar-
ket, which in our case are the banks and the customers, participated in
drafting and supervising the implementation of the ethical codes.63
Yet despite the similarity between the ethical codes and binding legis-
lation, there are many distinctions between them.
62. For example, the Consumer Protection Law, 5741-1981; the Insurance Contract Law,
5741-1981; the Supervision of Insurance Business Law, 5741-1981; the Banking (Licensing) Law,
5741-1981; the Banking (Customer Service) Law, 5741-1981.
63. The criteria for ethical codes in the area of consumer protection was stated in several
articles in the seventh volume of the Journal of Consumer Policy. See Jean Calais-Auloy, Collec-
tively Negotiated Agreements: Proposed Reforms in France, 7 J. OF CONSUMER POL. 115-123
(1988); Jules Stuyek, Consumer Soft Law in Belgium, 7 J. OF CONSUMER POL. 125-135 (1981);
Ewoud H. Hondius, Non-Legislative Means of Consumer Protection: The Deutch Perspective, 7 J.
OF CONSUMER POL. 137-156 (1981).
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Codes of ethics have advantages and disadvantages, when com-
pared with binding legislation. The advantages are:
(1) Flexibility - an ethical code is more adaptable - having consider-
ation for market changes - than a statute.
(2) Enforcement - there is a greater chance that the ethical code will
be enforced than provisions of statute if, of course, the commer-
cial parties examine themselves and are willing to cooperate.
(3) Variety - solutions may be proposed beyond what is acceptable
in the statute.
(4) Willingness - presumably, commercial bodies are prepared to ex-
ercise greater care in complying with the rules of the ethical code
than they are in complying with legislative provisions.
Despite these advantages, the accepted approach in the field of
banking is that ethical codes cannot replace binding legislation, be-
cause of the disadvantages endemic to these codes. The disadvantages
are:
(1) Doubts as to the willingness of the commercial organizations -
particularly where there are significant interests involved, such as
bank commissions and service fees. It is easier to reach agree-
ment about disclosure duties, etc.
(2) Doubts regarding market willingness - the fact is that until now
there are almost no fair trade conventions (i.e., ethical codes) in
Israel, due to the lack of willingness on the part of the commercial
organizations to becoming parties to such conventions.
(3) Implementation - even when a code is agreed upon, there is a
doubt as to who will supervise its implementation and who will
ensure its actual realization.
(4) Legitimacy - Statutes and regulations have legitimacy. It is ques-
tionable whether there is the same legitimacy for codes of ethics,
and this reduces the chances of enforcing them.
(5) Participation of all the commercial organizations - it is not clear
how one can compel all the members of the relevant commercial
organizations to participate in a convention and undertake to
comply with the provisions of the ethical code. If one important
commercial bank announces that it is not prepared to take part in
the ethics code, how does one force it? The truth is that it is not
possible. Leaving significant commercial bodies outside the code
frustrates its chances of enforcement and would raise significant
questions regarding its validity.
(6) Proper participation of the consumer organizations - in Israel
there are two small consumer organizations. The number of em-
ployees of both of these together is smaller than the number of
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employees in one branch of a bank. They deal with dozens of
issues. Bank related issues occupy about five to ten percent of
their attention. Time wise, their best attempt at dealing with the
issues would not amount to more than half of the working time of
a single employee. It is difficult to see how a lone employee could
conduct negotiations with the representatives of the commercial
banks in Israel, which employ tens of thousands of employees.
The consumers are not sufficiently organized and they have no-
one to represent them on complex issues.
The conclusion is clear. Ethical codes cannot replace legislation.
But the question however is whether it is viable to institute ethical
codes to supplement the existing legislation. An example of this is the
agreement reached with the Electric Company in which the Electric
Company undertook to compensate consumers for any non-compli-
ance with timetables. Experience shows that the Electric Company
complied with its undertaking. The convention signed with the Elec-
tric Company64 is proof of the difficulties that plague any attempt to
accept ethical codes in the banking field. In the field of electricity,
since there is only one electricity company, there was no need to ob-
tain the agreement of other companies too, in contrast to the situation
in the banking field. The convention itself was signed while its main
points were being prepared for enactment as regulations. Hence it
was clear to the Electric Company that if it failed to accept the con-
vention, its salient features would find expression in binding regula-
tions. Consumer organizations had only a secondary role in relation
to that of government supervisory bodies. Moreover, the Electric
Company enjoys a monopoly status, which increases the need for
mandatory legislative intervention, as opposed to consensually based
conventions. None of these elements exist in the banking sector, the
result being that the chance of creating an ethics code in the banking
field is very slim.
It is not at all clear whether the commercial organizations will be
willing to cooperate. The main reasons for agreeing to an ethical code
are: (1) a desire to improve the image of the sector; (2) a fear that if
the sector does not accept restrictions in an ethical code, the authori-
ties will impose these duties by statute; (3) media support of the
64. The convention was signed on December 5, 1994. The convention established rules for the
supply of electricity, the quality of the supply, and customer service. In particular, it determined
timetables for carrying out electric works and repairs to the network, and an undertaking to pay
automatic compensation to the customer's account for not complying with the timetable, a com-
mitment to an arbitration body, etc.
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changes; and (4) research that proves that there are indeed real
problems that justify the adoption of an ethical code.
It is doubtful whether there is a chance of any ethics code being
accepted in the banking sector in Israel. Even a government body
such as the Ministry of Justice has not succeeded in improving the
conditions of the current account contract in one of the large commer-
cial banks, and that was after years of pressure, despite the fact that
the attempt was made within an official and binding framework of the
Standard Contracts Tribunal and under the Standard Contracts Law,
5743-1982.
Nonetheless, despite the doubts about the possibility of reaching an
ethics code in the field of banking, it is appropriate to examine what
the main features of such a code would be. In this context, the author
suggests adopting the decision of the European Council65 of 1981,
under which the voluntary codes that are made as a result of dialogue
between suppliers and consumers will under no circumstances replace
statutes, regulations, and consumer protection supervisory measures
on a national or European level.66 The codes can supplement legisla-
tion, not replace it. If the heads of the banking sector in Israel were to
introduce ethical codes in areas of importance to the customer public,
supplementing the existing statutory requirements regulations, case-
law, and the rules of proper administration, it would be to their credit.
Constructing and drafting codes of ethics requires the appointment
of committees of experts, comprising representatives of the banks, the
supervisory bodies, and the consumer organizations. It would be nec-
essary to explain in advance that such codes are in addition to the
statute and not instead of it. It is possible to learn from the extensive
European experience in the field and in particular from the rich expe-
rience that has been gained in England with regard to fair trade con-
ventions.67 For ethical codes to have real clout, a government
65. Second Consumer Program, OFFICIAL J. OF COMMON MARKET, Cl13/7 (June 3, 1981).
66. See Luc Huyse & Stephan Damentitier, Decoding Codes: The Dialogue Between Consum-
ers and Suppliers Through Codes of Conduct in the European Community, 13 J. CONSUMER POL.
253 (1990).
67. The conventions in England were introduced without participation of representatives of
customers. The English codes are based on a variety of sources. See e.g., Christopher John
Miller, et al., Consumer and Trading Law; Text, Cases and Materials 499-535 (1998). A voluntary
code was formulated up in England in the field of banking, titled 'The Banking Code' - its
revised version came into effect on March 25, 1999. Another example is the voluntary code of
the banks in Switzerland, dated January 28, 1998, titled "Agreement on the Swiss bank's code of
conduct with regard to the exercise of due diligence" (CDB 98). We should also mention the
voluntary code of eleven large banks around the world with regard to money laundering, which
is called "Global Anti-Money-Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking," dated October 30,
2000, in Wolfsberg AML Principles. This last code is an example of a code that was adopted by
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supervisory body would have to be established. In view of the ongo-
ing reductions in Government budgets, the prospects of approval for
such a project are highly moot. In the absence of a significant budget-
ary allocation that would enable the establishment of an entity resem-
bling the Office of Fair Trading in England, which supports the
preparation, drafting, and supervision of codes, any code that is com-
posed will be in ineffective.
V. CONCLUSION
The author of this article has dealt with the field of consumer pro-
tection for over twenty years, during which he was involved in teach-
ing and research in universities and colleges, including work as the
legal counsel for the Consumer Protection Authority for seventeen
years. From the perspective of this experience, it would seem that
there is no substitute for legislation, case-law, and administrative su-
pervision of commercial entities in general, and the banking sector in
particular. Despite all the difficulties and deficiencies in enforcing the
banking laws, these methods are preferable to ethical codes. Such
codes may have a place, but only as a supplement to the existing ar-
rangements, and not in their stead. There are grounds for encourag-
ing the heads of the banking sector to adopt codes of practice 68 in
addition to the existing legislation, as a part of improving the image of
the banking sector.
the large banks around the world on the subject of money laundering. Apparently, until re-
cently, the existing legislation on this issue in many countries was insufficient. Large banks were
caught committing banking offences and acts that were carried out for the purpose of money
laundering. The banks, heedful of their reputation for integrity, were prepared to take several
restrictions upon themselves in this matter.
68. For example, codes of practice could be used to broaden the duties of disclosure in the
banking realm beyond what is currently required by statute. In my view this is an area in which
ethical codes stand a chance of being adopted in the banking realm. Examples of provisions that
might be included in such codes: agreement for proper disclosure of the statutory provisions and
bank procedures in documents presented to customers and also disclosure of instructions regard-
ing proper bank procedure; declarations of banks regarding their intention to indemnify the
customer public in cases of misconduct. Even if these declarations add nothing from the view-
point of the substantive law, they benefit the customer public in directing their intention to their
rights as consumers.
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